This paper produces a comprehensive theory of the value of Bayesian information and its static demand. Our key insight is to assume 'natural units' corresponding to the sample size of conditionally i.i.d. signals -focusing on the smooth nearby model of the precision of an observation of a Brownian motion with uncertain drift. In a two state world, this produces the heat equation from physics, and leads to a tractable theory. We derive explicit formulas that harmonize the known small and large sample properties of information, and reveal some fundamental properties of demand:
Introduction
Information acquisition is an irreversible process. One cannot return to the pristine state of ignorance once apprised any given fact. Heat dissipation also obeys the arrow of time:
The heat equation in physics describing its transition is not time symmetric. This paper begins with an observation that this link is not merely philosophical. In static models of Bayesian information acquisition, the value function of beliefs and the quantity of information acquired obeys an inhomogeneous form of the heat equation. We show that a nonlinear transformation of the value function and beliefs exactly obeys the heat equation. This paper exploits this and a parallel insight and crafts the first global theory of the value of information and its demand. For a binary state world, we derive explicit formulas that provide the bigger picture on the famous nonconcavity of information, and the unique demand curve that it induces: We characterize the "choke-off demand" level, and also make many novel findings -eg., demand elasticity is monotonically falling to zero.
Information is an important good, and lies at the heart of most innovative research in decision-making, game theory, and general equilibrium analysis. Yet information is also a poorly understood good. This first of all owes to a lack of natural units. Blackwell's Theorem only considers one signal, for instance. We thus start by measuring information in its 'natural units' corresponding to signal sample sizes, or equivalently, the precision of a normally distributed signal. This is the foundation of our entire theory.
Our first insight is really a technical one that opens the door to our theory. We produce in Lemmas 1-4 a transformation jointly of time and beliefs yielding a detrended log likelihood ratio process. This process is the unique one sharing two critical characteristics:
First, it has unit diffusion coefficient (variance). Second -and much more subtly -it allows us to change measure to produce a Wiener process without adding a new stochastic process. This immediately delivers to us in Lemma 5 a simple transition law for beliefs.
This density has the key property that it is proportional to its time derivatives (Lemma 6).
Underlying everything is the standard ∨-shaped payoff function of the belief in the high state: A decision maker takes the low action left of a cross-over belief, and the high action right of it. It so turns out that the ex post value of information is a multiple of the payoff to a call option whose strike price is the cross-over belief. With this insight, it is not surprising that our analysis traces the two routes used to price options: the heat equation approach of Black and Scholes (1973) and the martingale measure tack of Harrison and Kreps (1979) . Yet the belief process is less tractable than the geometric Brownian motion assumed for asset prices, and our transformation therefore more complex.
Using the original belief process, the payoff function of beliefs and information demand obeys an inhomogeneous heat equation (Lemma 7). In our critical innovation, we perform both a change of variables, blending time and log-likelihood ratios, and a nonlinear transformation of payoffs to produce the standard heat equation. We then exploit the solution of the heat equation, and then in Lemma 8 via martingale methods. Either way, Theorem 1 explicitly expresses the value of information in terms of the normal distribution.
We then turn to our substantive findings. Theorem 2 expresses the marginal value of information in terms of the derivatives of the transition belief density. This reduces analysis of the value derivative to a polynomial in the reciprocal demand. Using this, Corollary 1 finds that the marginal value is initially zero -the nonconcavity -as found in Radner-Stiglitz (1984) [RS] , and rigorously formalized in Chade-Schlee (2002) [CS] . The sufficient conditions in CS for this result do not encompass our model. By Theorem 3, the marginal value convexly rises, is then concave and hill-shaped, and finally convex and falling -as in Figure 1 . We compute demand at the peak marginal value of information.
So with linear prices, information demand vanishes at high prices, before jumping to a positive level (Theorem 4) strictly below the peak marginal value. The Law of Demand then kicks in, and the demand schedule thereafter coincides with the marginal value schedule. One never buys just a little information. Theorem 5 quantifies the nonconcavity, determining the minimal purchase on average to be 2.5% of the expected payoff stakes.
In Theorem 6, we find that information demand is hill-shaped in beliefs, unlike the dynamic model with impatience of Moscarini and Smith (2001) [MS1] . Furthermore, it jumps down to 0 near beliefs 0 and 1, when the choke-off demand binds. Here we discover an interesting contrast with sequential learning models, because our thresholds owe to global optimality considerations. Completing this picture, Theorem 7 finds that information demand is hill-shaped in beliefs (quasi-concave, precisely) -opposite to MS1.
A novel topic we explore is the demand elasticity. Theorem 8 asserts that information demand is initially elastic at interior beliefs; the elasticity is globally falling in price, and is vanishing in the price. This analysis exploits all of our analytic structure.
We finally revisit in Theorem 9 the large demand analysis of Moscarini and Smith (2002) [MS2] now quickly via our explicit formulas rather than large deviation theory.
MS2 also measure information by sample size, but assumed cheap discrete information, and not our continuous or weak discrete signals. The marginal value of information eventually vanishes exponentially fast, producing the logarithmic demand of MS2 at small prices.
We sharpen the demand approximation, and find that it is monotonically approached.
Our Gaussian information is generated by the time that one observes a Brownian motion with state-dependent drift, but state-independent diffusion coefficient. Consider a discrete model where the decision-maker chooses how many conditional iid signals to draw. Theorem 10 shows that Bayes' updating weakly approaches the continuous time Brownian filter as the signal strength vanishes, and quantity is rescaled downwards. We show that garbled signals have precisely this property. We next apply the Theorem of the Maximum, finding in Theorem 11 that the demand formulas and value of information approximate the discrete formulas for small bits of information (weak signals).
The experimentation literature aside, we know of one related information demand paper. In Kihlstrom (1974) , a consumer faces a linear price for precision of a Gaussian signal given a (conjugate) Gaussian prior. For a specific hyperbolic utility function, he can write utility as a function of signals and avoid computing the density of posteriors.
We next lay out and develop the model, and very rapidly progress through the results on beliefs, the value and marginal value of information, demand, and weak discrete signals.
The Model
A. The Decision Problem. Assume a one-shot decision model, where a decision maker (DM ) chooses how much information to buy, and then acts. For simplicity, we assume two actions A, B, whose payoffs π θ A , π θ B depend on the state θ = L, H. Action B is best in state H and action A is best in state L:
Since the DM has prior beliefs q ∈ (0, 1), the convex ∨-shaped expected payoff function is
We assume no dominated actions, so that payoffs have a kink at a cross-over beliefq
The DM never incurs a payoff loss greater than M −m from making a wrong action choice; this bound is tight when either difference (
B. The Standard Information Acquisition Model. Given is a probability space
(Ω, F, P ), were Ω is a set, F a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, and P a probability measure on F. This space captures all uncertainty, including the state of the world θ = L, H.
Before making a decision, the DM can obtain information of any level t ≥ 0 about the state θ. While more information could plausibly connote better quality information, we specifically mean that the DM with information level t 2 knows strictly more about the state of the world than does the DM with information level t 1 ≤ t 2 . So assume a filtration {F t : t ∈ [0, ∞)}, so that the σ-algebras are nested
The DM observes F t , updates her beliefs to q(t) = P (H|F t ) from the prior q(0) = q.
The ex ante expected payoff (prior to seeing
, and the value of information is v(t, q) = u(t, q) − u(q) -namely, the expected increase in utility from observing F t . Faced with a constant marginal cost c > 0 of information, the DM can choose the observation 'time' t (namely, the demand level) at cost ct. The net payoff given the level t is v(t, q) − ct. This is maximized by choosing the information level τ (c, q) > 0, which is our demand schedule. Finally, the DM chooses the best action.
1 Further, it is without loss of generality to assume for simplicity that π H A = 0, since the decision must be made. An analogous choice of π H B = 1 is not allowed later on, without also scaling the cost function.
C. The Natural Continuous Units of Information. We actually have a specific filtration in mind. Let the DM observe the time-t realization of a process X(·) with drift ±µ in states H, L, respectively, and constant diffusion coefficient σ > 0. Thus, the signal is twice as informative when t doubles -just as is true for the sample size of conditionally iid signals. We show in Section 7 that this approximates discrete bit sampling models.
By Theorem 9.1 in Liptser and Shirayev (2001) , when observing the realizations of the Brownian Motion X(t) in continuous time, the beliefq(t) = P (H|F t ) obeys the Bayes filter dq(t) = ζq(t)(1 −q(t))dW (t), where ζ ≡ 2µ/σ is the signal/noise ratio, and W (·) is a standard Wiener process w.r.t. the measure P (i.e. unconditional on θ = H, L). Notice that if we define q(t) =q(t/ζ 2 ), then 2 (dq(t)) 2 = (dq(t)) 2 /ζ 2 = q(t) 2 (1 − q(t)) 2 dt, and thus
We henceforth set ζ = 1 and compute the time (demand)t with anyζ > 0 fromt = t/ζ 2 .
Beliefs and Log Likelihood Ratios
We begin by describing the limit behavior of beliefs q(·).
Lemma 1 (Long Run Beliefs) The belief process in (2) satisfies
So the probability that q(t) / ∈ (0, 1) in finite time is zero and q(∞) = 0 or 1.
The proof of (a) is in the appendix: q(·) avoids the boundary as the diffusion coefficient in (2) vanishes quickly near q(·) = 0, 1. Part (b) owes to the martingale property.
Our objective is to derive from posterior beliefs a tractable process that contains the same information. In particular, we aim for a simple standard Wiener process. First, in probability measure so that this transformation retains the martingale property. There is a degree of freedom here, which we resolve in Lemma 3 on grounds of tractability.
Proof: Using Ito's lemma we get
Solving
This lemma is intuitive, since Bayes rule is multiplicative in likelihood ratios, and therefore additive in log-likelihood ratios. Substituting from (3), we then find
where we have implicitly defined ν(t). Next, define the probability measure Q on (Ω, F t )
by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
This result is important as it does not introduce a new stochastic process. With a different R-N derivative, we would have two imperfectly correlated stochastic processes q(·) and R(·), and derivation of our results would become exceedingly difficult. A unique change of measure maintains the uni-dimensionality of the stochastic process.
To prove Lemma 3, observe that writing (1 − q(t) )dW (t) -namely, our belief filter (2). In other words,
So motivated, if we set ν(s) = q(s) − 1 in (5), then we get Lemma 3. Equation (4) implies that A(t) = −t/2, which we henceforth assume. Thus,
Observe that z(·) is a partially de-trended log-likelihood ratio (logLR). While the logLR of state L to state H is well-known to be a martingale conditional on state H, this is not useful because we do not know state H. We instead first subtract the deterministic portion of the drift from the logLR, and then change measure from P to the conditional measure Q given q(t). This yields a martingale such that the R-N derivative of Q is q(t)/q.
is a Wiener process under the probability measure Q. Hence, z(·) is a Q-martingale and the pdf for transitions z → y in time t > 0 is given as follows:
2 is the standard normal pdf. Equation (6) follows from the facts that (4) can be written as dz(t) = dŴ (t) andŴ (·) is a Q-Wiener process by Girsanov's theorem (see e.g. Øksendal (1998, pp. 155-6) ).
We now derive the belief transition pdf ξ(t, q, r) = ∂ ∂r P (q(t) ≤ r|q(0) = q), using the above normal transition pdf for transformed log-likelihood ratios z(t) (see Figure 2 ).
Lemma 5 (Beliefs)
The transition probability density function of beliefs q(t) is given by
for all (t, q, r) 
(1−r)q .
r Figure 2 : Transition Probability Function. We plot the symmetric pdf ξ(t, q, r) for transitions from q = 0.5 to any belief r after an elapse time t = 1.
Proof: Fix an arbitrary measurable real function η(·).
The paper hereafter repeatedly exploits this belief transition pdf to derive the formula for the value and marginal value of information, as well as the properties of the demand function. In particular, this yields a critical time derivative:
Lemma 6 (t-Derivative) The belief transition pdf q(t) satisfies, for 0 < q, r < 1 and t > 0 :
The Value of Information

Option Pricing Analogy
Before deriving our value function, it helps to motivate this with a related exercise done in finance. To this end, simplify matters by positing that action A is a safe action yielding
zero payoff, so that π H A = π L A = 0. Equation (1) can then be written as follows
Here we get immediately the following interpretation for u(q)/M : It equals the payoff of a European call option with strike priceq and underlying asset price q. Black and Scholes (1973) derive the option pricing formula when the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. They use an arbitrage argument to deduce a parabolic PDE that reduces to the heat equation after a change of variable. In this transformation, time is understood as time to maturity. But geometric Brownian motion is still far more tractable than our nonlinear belief diffusion (2), and thus only a time rescaling of the range variable is needed. By contrast, we use a more complicated transformation.
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) later derived the option pricing formula using martingale methods. In our paper, the z-process is a martingale under the measure Q just as the discounted asset price is a martingale under the 'pricing measure' in Harrison and Kreps (1979) . Our first approach follows this line of thought, but again, its execution requires a simultaneous range and domain transformation.
Value Function Derivation
Applying the backward equation to u(t, q) = E q [u(q(t))] for the driftless belief diffusion process q(·) in (2) yields our key insight into payoffs: 4
Lemma 7 (Inhomogeneous Heat Equation) Expected payoffs u(t, q) satisfy
Notice that (8) (1) respectively, then the temperature is increasing ut > 0 iff uqq > 0. This is exactly analogous to the behavior of expected payoffs as we acquire more information.
As the inhomogeneous heat equation is not directly soluble, we proceed as follows. Let us define z = log q 1−q and transform expected payoffs as h(t, z) = u t,
Lemma 8 (Stochastic Representation) Transformed expected payoffs are represented as
Proof 1: The Martingale Method. We first follow the approach of Harrison and Kreps (1973) , and exploit our martingale z(·). Write the posterior expected payoff as
Proof 2: The Heat Equation.
We now adapt the approach of Black and Scholes (1973) . Change the variables in (8) from beliefs q to
-where t is understood as the elapse time. Next, define
5 Simply take the derivatives below and apply
We thank Robert Israel of UBC for first pointing out a related transformation.
The solution of the heat equation (e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1991, page 254) ) yields:
Finally, using H(t, Z + t/2) = h(t, Z) gives the representation (9).
We now exploit the above stochastic representation to derive the value of information.
It follows from Lemma 1 that the long-run limit of the expected payoff is given by
i.e., we can write u(∞, q) =ū(q). Let us define the full information gap as follows
Thus, FIG is the difference between the expected payoffs with full information and time t information. We now explore the behavior of the value function v(t, q) for finite t > 0.
, where the full information gap satisfies
where
The appendix proof uses the fact that in Lemma 8, e −t/2−z(t) is log-normally distributed. Figure 4 illustrates the posterior expected payoff with different information levels.
From Figure 4 , we see that the value of information v(t, q) is high when q is close to the cross-over beliefq, and is low when q is close to 0 or 1. The results in our setting are analogous to the properties of call options. The value of information in our setting is like the time value of the option. Informational value is increasing in t just as the time value of the option is increasing in the time to maturity.
The Marginal Value of Information
Loosely, information only has positive marginal value if we hit the cross-over beliefq at time t; its value is then increasing in the payoff slope difference M − m and belief variancê q 2 (1−q) 2 . Since v(t, q) = u(t, q)−u(q), the time derivatives of the value of information and expected payoffs coincide, v t n (t, q) = u t n (t, q), for all n = 1, 2, . . .. All these derivatives admit a similar expression, as we now see:
In particular, the marginal value of information is given by a scaled standard normal density:
Theorem 2 is proven in the appendix by just differentiating Theorem 1. We now give an incomplete but suggestive development of the marginal value of information in terms of the derivative of the belief transition density. Since the backward equation u t = 1 2 q 2 (1−q) 2 uholds at any time ε > 0, and since
where we approximate unear the kink with u(ε, q) ≈
for all q ∈ (q − ε,q + ε), and otherwise u(ε, q) = 0. Taking the limit ε → 0, we get u(0,q) = ∞ and otherwise t, q,q) . Comparing the marginal value schedule to the likewise left-skew log-normal density, the tail of v t is asymptotically much thinner. Further notice that while the value of information behaves continuously as beliefs q converge upon the cross-over beliefq, the marginal value explodes for small t. This discontinuity is reflected in the next result.
Corollary 1 (Derivatives) The marginal value of information obeys
The proof is in the appendix. Part (b) is the 'nonconcavity in the value of information' conclusion of RS and CS, since a marginal value that starts at zero cannot globally fall.
(See Figure 5. ) We go somewhat beyond this conclusion in part (c), finding that all higher order derivatives also initially vanish for our informational framework.
Note that the Inada condition of RS or of CS (their assumption A1) simply does not apply. 7 As natural as our Gaussian model is -it is the limit of the discrete sampling models, as we see in §8 -it escapes known sufficient conditions. And yet v t (0+, q) = 0.
We now globally describe the marginal value of information. To this end, let us define an inflection point in the value of information, where the marginal value peaks:
6 As usual, v t (0+, q) = lim s↓0 v t (s, q), and v t n (0+, q) = lim s↓0 v t n (s, q). 7 In our case, the signal X has mean µ θ t and variance t. The RS Inada condition fails, and assumption A1 in CS fails, because the signal density derivative in t explodes at t = 0 -as CS acknowledge for Kihlstrom (1974) . But the critical difference is not the signal distribution, as CS suggest: Had we assumed the convex continuous action model of Kihlstrom, there would be no easily deduceable nonconcavity:
We remark that this inflection point demand is surprisingly independent of the payoff levels except insofar as it affects the cross-over beliefq. This holds in spite of the fact that the marginal value of information (14) 
where v t (t, q) > 0, according to Corollary 1. Now v tt (t, q) = 0 gives Υ(t, q) ≡ t 2 + 4t − 4L 2 (q, q) = 0, which yields (15). Part (a) owes to Υ(s, q) ≶ 0 for all s ≷ T FL (q).
For (b), note that v ttt (0+, q) = 0 according to Corollary 1. Second, from Theorem 2:
and hence v ttt (t, q) = 0 if t 4 + 8t 3 + (48 − 8L 2 )t 2 − 96L 2 t + 16L 2 = 0. Clearly, v ttt > 0 near t = 0. So if there is only one positive root T 1 (q) then v ttt (t, q) < 0 for all t > T 1 (q). In light of Lemma 6, the convexity before T FL (q) owes to the increasing transition pdf (ξ t (t, q,q) ≥ 0) and the concavity after T FL (q) owes to the decreasing pdf (ξ t (t, q,q) ≤ 0).
The Demand for Information
A. The Demand Curve. We now consider linear pricing of information c(t) = ct, where c is a strictly positive constant. Let demand τ (c, q) maximize consumer surplus
We hereafter fix q =q, ignoring the cross-over beliefq, since it is a single point (i.e. nongeneric); we can thus avoid hedging our theorems. Because of the non-concavity near quantity 0, and since the marginal value finitely peaks, there exists a choke-off cost c CH (q) > 0, above which demand is zero, and an implied minimum choke-off demand,
At the cost c CH (q) > 0, demand is T CH (q) and consumer surplus is zero.
Thus, marginal value is falling, and so T CH (q) ≥ T FL (q), as in Figure 6 . Summarizing: 
Let us define
Demand is captured by the FOC precisely when the cost falls below the choke-off cost.
The integrand is first negative, since v t (0+, q) = 0, and eventually negative, since v t (∞, q) = 0. If c > c CH (q), then the integral (consumer surplus) is always negative, and so the optimal demand is t = 0. Indeed, simply apply v tt (t, q) < 0 for all t > T FL (q) (true by Theorem 3). Notice that the law of demand applies to information too, but only after the price drops below the choke-off level c CH (q), so that positive demand is warranted. Figure 7 illustrates these results: the jump in information demand as costs drop, as well as the Law of Demand.
B. Quantifying the Lumpiness. We now wish to explore the size of the nonconcavity in the demand for information. The most direct approach here is to quantify the minimum expenditure T v t (T, q) on information that the DM must incur. Of course, this amount should increase in the maximum payoff stakes, simply because the marginal value of information does, by Lemma 2. Additionally, if beliefs are near 0 or 1, then information demand vanishes. Seeking an appropriate normalization, let the expected payoff stakes denote the maximum expected payoff loss from choosing a wrong action. We evaluate these using the worst case scenario, which occurs at the cross-over belief q =q:
This clearly vanishes whenq = 0, 1, and increases in the maximum payoff stakes M − m. 
Proof: Suppressing the arguments of L = L(q, q) and T CH (q), we have
Using this equation, a lower bound on (20) is 0.025, as we show in the appendix.
One reason why we take an average here is that the threshold choke-off cost c CH (q) vanishes as beliefs q approachq or the extremes 0, 1. Thus, the minimum information purchase likewise vanishes nearing those three beliefs, and only an average makes sense.
C. Demand as a Function of Beliefs. A classic question asked of Bayesian sequential
learning models is the range of beliefs with a positive experimentation level.
Theorem 6 (Interval Demand) Demand τ (c, q) > 0 iff beliefs q belong to an interior interval q(c),q(c) , where the thresholds 0 < q(c) <q <q(c) < 1 obey v τ c, q(c) , q(c) = τ c, q(c) c and
v (τ (c,q(c))) = τ (c,q(c)) c.(21)
Furthermore, the choke-off demands are T CH (q(c)) = τ (c,q(c)) and T CH (q(c)) = τ (c, q(c)).
Proof: First of all, demand is clearly positive at beliefq, since v t (0+,q) = ∞, by (b) in Corollary 1. Further, demand vanishes at q = 0, 1, since v t (t, 0) = u t (t, 0) = 0 and v t (t, 1) = u t (t, 1) = 0 for all t. Thus, any interval structure obeys 0 < q(c) <q <q(c) < 1.
Next, when positive, demand must satisfy the FOC v t (τ (q), q) = c. Thus, it suffices to prove that v t (t, q) is strictly quasi-concave in q, but this fails. Instead, we show local quasi-concavity at the optimal demand τ (c, q), since v t (t, q) is continuous. Specifically, we
show that v tq (τ (c, q), q) = 0 implies v tqq (τ (c, q), q) < 0.
Differentiating the FOC yields τ q (c, q) = −v tq /v tt , if we suppress arguments. Hence,
because our premise v tq (τ (c, q), q) = 0 is clearly equivalent to τ q (c, q) = 0, by the FOC.
By Theorem 3-(b), we have v tt (τ (c, q), q) < 0, and so v tqq (τ (c, q), q) and τ(c, q) share the , q) , q) by Lemma 7, we complete the proof with
Finally, demand vanishes when the DM is indifferent between buying and not buying at all -namely, at the choke-off level. So (21) follows, and T CH (q) is as described.
These results strikingly differ from their analogues in a dynamic setting. That information demand is positive precisely on an interior interval is completely in harmony with the standard sequential experimentation result (see MS1). However, it holds for an entirely unrelated reason! In sequential experimentation, the DM stops when his Bellman equation indicates that marginal costs and benefits of further experimentation balance.
In our static demand setting, the DM buys no information when total costs and benefits of any information purchase balance. Namely, given the nonconcavity in the value of information, this demand choke-off decision turns on considerations of global optimality.
The following theorem gives the relationship between positive demand and beliefs.
Theorem 7 (Hill-Shaped Demand) τ (c, ·) is quasi-concave in beliefs q ∈ q(c),q(c) .
Proof: By Theorem 6, τ (c, q) > 0 and so τ q (c, q) = 0 implies τ(c, q) < 0 by (22)-(23).
Again, a comparison with the dynamic case is instructive, and here it is a contrast in the result, and not just the rationale for the result. MS1 assume a convex cost of information in a sequential experimentation model and deduce instead that information demand is U-shaped and convex, and not hill-shaped and concave. The static demand solution is the intuitive one, with demand greatest when the DM is most uncertain.
D. The Elasticity of Demand. The elasticity of the demand equals |τ c (c, q)c/τ (c, q)|.
When the elasticity equals 1, the demand level is T E (q), and revenue v t (t, q)t is maximized.
Using this fact, we characterize T E (q) below, using the belief derivative (16):
Like the peak marginal value T FL (q), the unit elastic demand does not depend on the underlying payoff stakes, apart from the dependence on the cross-over beliefq. Further, the marginal value is clearly falling at T E (q), since it exceeds T FL (q). A key question in our setting is whether it lies above the choke-off demand. The answer is yes, provided the belief is sufficiently interior.
Theorem 8 (Elasticity)
(a) Demand is initially elastic for q ∈ (q,q), where 0 <q <q <q < 1.
(b) Demand elasticity is decreasing in the cost c, for all c ≤ c CH (q).
Observe that (q,q) ⊂ (q(c),q(c)) because demand is positive for q ∈ (q,q). Define c E (q) = v t (T E (q), q), namely, the cost level where demand elasticity equals 1. Then c E (q) < c CH (q) iff q ∈ (q,q). Rephrasing part (a), information demand is elastic for c ∈ (c E (q), c CH (q)]
and inelastic if c < c E (q).
To make some sense of part (b), one can reason that the marginal value of information drops off so fast in the tail of the normal pdf that the demand elasticity falls monotonically.
E. Large Demand. We now give a simple asymptotically applicable demand formula.
It is consistent with the formula that MS2 derived for conditionally iid samples from any signal distribution, using large deviation theory. Our work here, which follows from our Gaussian framework, is more refined, as we specify an additional error term, 8 and show that it is positive -in other words, the limit demand curve is approached from above.
Theorem 9 (Low Prices) If c is small then the optimal demand is approximated by:
where o(1) vanishes in c, and where
Observe that the approximate difference 2[log(− log(c))]/ log(c) between demand and
2 log(− log c) is negative, and asymptotically vanishing in c (see Figure 7) . Therefore, the three c-dependent terms of the demand function (25) provide (in order, adding them from left to right) increasingly accurate approximations. As the cost of information vanishes, demand is essentially logarithmic.
Proof of Theorem 9: First, if the cost c is small then T FOC (c, q) exists and u(T FOC (c, q), q) ≥ u(0, q). So in this case
Taking logs, using the definitions of L(q, q) and F (q) yields the log inverse demand curve:
. Notice that ψ −1 exists when ψ (x) = 1 − 1/(2x) − B/x 2 > 0, which is true for large x. 9 Rearranging (26) produces the demand curve τ (c, q) = 8ψ −1 (F (q) − log c). The appendix shows that
Recall that we have normalized ζ = 1. Had we not done so, the demand function in (25) would hold if divided by ζ 2 . MS2 analyze the large demand for information as the price c vanishes, for any arbitrary signal, not just for weak or gaussian signals as we do here. They define a general information index for a signal, ρ ∈ (0, 1), where 0 means perfectly informative, and 1 uninformative. They show that the demand function for small c has the same logarithmic form as in (25), with same slope when we define ζ 2 = −8 log(ρ):
In other words, the demand for any signal with information index ρ at small price is approximately the same as the demand time with ζ 2 = −8 log(ρ). Notice that ζ rises from 0 to infinity as informativeness rises (ρ falls from 1 to 0).
7 The Natural 'Small Bits' of Information
Beliefs
Any theory of variable quantity information requires that it be measured in sufficiently small units. While the paper assumed the diffusion process X(·), we now observe that this well-approximates a wide class of discrete choice models with 'small bits' of information. Beliefs evolve according to Bayes rule:
We want this Markov process to converge weakly to the diffusion (2) as ∆ vanishes and n explodes. 11 When this obtains, q ∆ ( t/∆ ∆) and q(t) have nearly the same finitedimensional distributions (suppressing Z arguments), as the next result asserts.
Theorem 10 (Small Bits) For every t > 0, the Markov process in (27) converges weakly
Example. We propose one natural way to construct the required g (·|θ, ∆) from any signal {f (·|θ)}. Just garble f by supposing that in state θ the signal is drawn from f (·|θ) with chance 1/2 + √ ∆, and from the other "incorrect" distribution with chance 1/2 − √ ∆.
For every ∆ > 0, this yields the required state-independent support Z. As ∆ vanishes, the signal becomes pure noise, with state-independent limitḡ(Z) = [f (Z|H) + f (Z|L)]/2.
One can verify for this example, using (28) and lim ∆↓0 g(Z|θ, ∆) =ḡ(Z) > 0, that
For example, if f (z|H) = 2z and f (z|L) = 2(1 − z) for z ∈ [0, 1], then (29) implies
Thus, the relevant approximation is an arithmetic Wiener process with state-dependent drift µ = ±(2/ √ 3)σ for any diffusion coefficient σ.
Value and Demand Approximation
The ex ante value of a sample of n = t/∆ conditionally i.i.d. draws from {g (·|θ, ∆)} is
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the distribution of the discrete time belief process q ∆ ( t/∆ ∆). Since the latter converges weakly to q(t), and u(·) is a continuous function:
for every prior q ∈ [0, 1]. The discrete time value function converges to the continuous
Now consider the following decision problem. Fix ∆ > 0. The DM can purchase n conditionally i.i.d. draws of Z, non-sequentially, at unit price c∆ and total outlays nc∆,
Note that Π ∆ (0|c, q) = v(0, q) and v ∆ (n∆, q) ≤ max θ,a π θ a for any ∆ > 0, so that lim n→∞ Π ∆ (n∆|c, q) = −∞. It follows that a finite non-negative maximum of Π ∆ (n∆|c, q) over integers n = 0, 1, 2, . . . exists, and is attained by a correspondence N ∆ (c, q).
The analogous continuous time problem when observing X(t) with state-dependent drift is sup t≥0 Π(t|c, q), where Π(t|c, q) = v(t, q) − ct. This problem yields the real-valued demand function τ (c, q) that we have characterized. Along with (30), we find that
The maximized value in the discrete model is thus near that of the continuous time model.
The proof is in the appendix.
Next, the demand elasticity is also approximated by the discrete approximations:
Conclusion
We have measured information in units that correspond to sample sizes of conditionally iid signals, and assumed weak enough signals. In this setting, we have completely and tractably characterized the demand for information for the two state world. We have, in particular, provided the full picture of the famous informational nonconcavity for the first time. Additionally, we have characterized the elasticity of information, the large demand formula, and the dependence of demand on beliefs. Finally, we have shown that our model well approximates all small bit models of information. Our theory extends, with additional complexity, to a model with any finite set of actions, since that merely adds to the number of cross-over beliefs. The restriction to two states, instead, is real.
Kihlstrom (1974) 
A.2 Value Function Derivation: Proof of Theorem 1
By Lemma 8, the expected payoff can be represented as an integral as follows
Let us exploit symmetry φ(y)
The second and the last integrands in (32) can be simplified using
which is the pdf of a normal variable with mean √ t and unit variance. This and (32) give
Symmetry φ(y) = φ(−y) and all parametric definitions yield
Using Φ (y) = 1 − Φ (−y), we get F IG (t, q); v(t, q) = u(t, q) − u(q) then yields (12).
A.3 Marginal Value: Proof of Theorem 2
Differentiating Theorem 1 with respect to t, and denoting L = L(q, q), yields
where the second equality owes to φ (−x) = φ (x) and φ
and the last to (14) yields (13) by taking further time derivatives and by using Lemma 5.
A.4 Slopes at Zero: Proof of Corollary 1
Claim 1 For any n > 1 we have:
where A 2(n−1) (q), · · · , A 0 (q) are bounded functions of q.
produces, via the product rule, a polynomial in 1/t whose highest power rises by two.
The first equality of Corollary 1 follows from (14) because φ − 1 2
for all (t, q) ∈ (0, ∞) × (0, 1). The second, third, and fourth equalities owe to (7), (8) 
This gives the fifth equality of Corollary 1.
A.5 Information Lumpiness: Proof of Theorem 5
Because
It can be shown that J(q) = A.6 Elasticity of Demand: Proof of Theorem 8
Proof of Part (a). Now we show that there exist two points where T E (q) = T CH (q) -one when q <q and one when q >q. Let us define the gross surplus function γ as follows
It suffices to show that γ(q) > 0 iff q ∈ (q,q), whereq ∈ (q,q). We will prove that γ(q) > 0 for q ∈ (q,q); the case (q,q) follows from symmetry. Differentiating (7) yields:
Claim 2 (q-Derivatives) The belief transition pdf q(t) obeys, for 0 < q, r < 1 and t > 0 :
Claim 3
We have γ(0+) = 0, γ q (0+) = −∞, and γ(q) > 0.
Proof: First we calculate γ(0+). Since lim q↓0 L(q, q) = lim q↓0 log q(1−q) q(1−q) = ∞, we get lim q↓0 T E (q) = lim q↓0 L 2 (q, q) = ∞ and using (7) and (14), we get
because Φ (r) ≤ 1 for all r. For the second term of v(T E (q), q), we have
Next we solve lim r↓0 γ q (r), where
Let us analyze the different terms separately. By Theorem 3, we have v tt (T E (q), q) < 0.
Differentiating (24) gives
, and so lim r↓0
For the third term of (36):
Finally, we calculate the value of γ(q) by using (34). We again divide the expression into different parts. Because L(q,q) = 0, we have T E (q) = 4, and so from (14), we get
Since T E (q) = 4, equation (12) gives
By subtracting (37) from (38), we get γ(q) > 0, since
Proof: Twice differentiating (34) gives
Substitute from (16), (17), as well as the formulas below from Claim 2 and Theorem 2:
From Claim 3 we get γ(q) > 0 and γ(ε) < 0 for ε > 0. Since γ(·) is continuous, there existsq ∈ (0,q) such that γ(q) = 0. The uniqueness follows from Claim 4. Hence, γ(q) > 0 for q ∈ (q,q). The proof for the existence and uniqueness ofq ∈ (q, 1) is symmetric.
Proof of Part (b). Note that when c ≤ c CH (q) then τ (c, q) > 0. Let us denote elasticity
. Hence, if we substitute from (16) and (17) for v tt /v t and v ttt /v tt , we get
which is positive because v tt (τ, q) < 0 when τ (c, q) > T CH (q). Hence, E(c) is rising in the cost c, and thus falling in the quantity τ .
A.7 Large Demand: Inverting the Inverse Demand Curve in Theorem 9
Claim 5 Assume that ε(x) > 0 is an increasing C 1 function of x, with ε(x)/x → 0, and
Simply notice that ε(x) = 
Taking a first order Taylor series of ε about x yields δ(
A.8 Convergent Belief Processes: Proof of Theorem 10
By Durrett (1996, Theorem 8.7 .1), three conditions must be met for weak convergence:
The discrete belief process has sample paths that are continuous in the limit with probability one, and the first two moments of the changes in the discrete time process converge to those of the continuous time process. We now verify these in succession:
1. Limit Continuity. Formally, for each ε > 0, we have the unconditional limit:
This follows from the continuity of Bayes rule (27) in the likelihoods g(Z|θ): As the signal becomes non-informative, beliefs move less and less, so that the above probability equals 
By the martingale property, we replace the variance with the expected squared increment:
Using ( We are now ready to use the auxiliary problem of maximizing Ω ∆ (y∆|c) over y ≥ 0. 
